Donnellan: “Reference and Definite Descriptions”. TWO USES OF . sentence “ Keith asserted that Smith’s murderer is insane.” To capture the. Keith Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions”. Due Feb 13, by 10am; Points 5; Submitting a discussion post; Available after Feb 2, at 12am. Keith Donnellan, Joseph Almog, and Paolo Leonardi function is the referential use of definite description, in which the speaker uses it to refer to something.
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But it does not seem plausible that there is a nearby possible world where the following is true. Themes from the Philosophy of Robert StalnakerOxford: Here we are using the restricted quantifier notation adopted in Neale A2 An indefinite NP in an argument position, however, ends up denoting an individual, because the semantics involves a free function variable that assigns an individual to the restriction predicate.
Perhaps, but there is no shortage of difficulties. The hypothesis is that it is functioning as a multi-purpose case marker, and when it is marking for genitive case, possessive meaning is one possible outcome. Written in response to the work of Bertrand Russell and P. This class of problems, sometimes called bishop sentenceshas yielded a number of proposed solutions. More recently, Soames ; ch.
See Kanazawa for a literature review and criticism of this idea. Donnellan uses a variety of locutions in trying to capture what is special about the referential use: Routledge and Keegan Paul. A man fell in front of the train.
Past, Present and FutureOxford: There are circumstances in which the Russellian gloss in 57 is true, but 56 is not true. We typically believe that Anna Karenina was written by Tolstoy, who descripptions not and is not the king of France, descriptipns do we really have a belief in which the king of France was not a bald Nazi?
This also raises the question of how far one can press the case based on examples like Philosophers have also been attracted to this view. The Philosophy of Language. We take them all. In a similar vein, if we utter 6.
Whatever the ultimate disposition of these cases, it is fair to say that there are more issues here than whether pronouns are to be treated as standing proxy for definite descriptions or indefinite descriptions.
It would follow that descriptions need not be relied upon as heavily as he imagined.
There is a sense in which Brown spoke falsely, but there is also clearly some pull for us to say that what he said was true. We will know more pending an investigation.
Hopefully, there was only one student involved. This story would require a story involving some movement and copying of the noun within the determiner phrase, but such a story would not be unheard of in contemporary work on the structure of determiner phrases see Larson Classical, Early, and Medieval Plays and Playwrights: Oxford University Press, The motivation for descriptionns idea would be as follows.
At the same time there is some pull to say that in such a case one is saying something false too. We want to know precisely why a pronoun looks like a definite description here, but an indefinite description there. University of Minnesota Press, — In dfeinite VI, Donnellan argues that his results are inconsistent both with Russell’s theory and with Strawson’s.
Situations and IndividualsCambridge, MA: Or at least a more detailed story needs to be told. From the Publisher via CrossRef no proxy jstor.
Daniel Hoek – – Krith Review 2: These include the sage plant examples discussed in Heimand Kadmon Search my Subject Specializations: If there is no present king of France, then an utterance containing such an expression is somehow defective. For all of that, the theory has encountered a number of objections.
Keith S. Donnellan – Reference and Definite Descriptions ()
Does this whole debate come down to a case of intuition swapping? The prospects for a unified donnella for determiner behavior seems remote. Fx ] Gx receives in a standard truth-conditional semantics.
The unwanted necessity objection collapses immediately because the use of a name does not commit the speaker to the object in question having all the properties in the bundle. There is no nearby possible world where Aristotle did all those things by age two. We now run into the teeth of the problem of unwanted ambiguity. Other versions of this idea were proposed in Strawson ksith ff.
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The problem is that the Russellian analysis seems to turn a contingent proposition into a necessary proposition. Deefinite number of other puzzles remain, including the problem of pronominal contradiction, which has been discussed by StrawsonDaviesLudlow and Nealeand van Rooy among many others.
Descriptivism holds that ordinary proper names e.